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Abstract  
Internet of Things (IoT) systems are ubiquitous, highly complex and dynamic event-based 
systems. These characteristics make their security analysis challenging. Security in IoT requires 
domain-specific methodologies and tools. The proposed methodologies need to be able to 
capture information from software and hardware constructs to security and social constructs. In 
this paper, in addition to refining the modeling language of the Apparatus Framework, we 
propose a class-based notation of the modeling language and a structured approach to transition 
between different models. Apparatus is a security framework developed to facilitate security 
analysis in IoT systems. We demonstrate the application of the framework by analyzing the 
security of smart public transport system. The security analysis and visualization of the system 
are facilitated by a software application that is developed as part of the Apparatus Framework. 
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1 Introduction 
Internet of Things (IoT) is a research area that has attracted considerable attention. One of the 
fundamental characteristics of IoT systems is their dynamic nature [1–3], where the state of 
devices varies during the system’s lifecycle. Devices in an IoT network change their state 
continuously since they connect and disconnect, sleep and wake up. The resting location, as well 
as the moving speed of the devices, may change at any time. From a security perspective, this 
means it is important to ensure security control effectiveness over time in a highly dynamic 
environment of operation with changing security requirements, threats, and vulnerabilities. 
 Smart cities are dynamic, complex and large-scale applications of IoT. They include multiple 
computing paradigms such as Edge and Fog computing along with a large number of 
stakeholders. Different IoT applications within the same smart city have different security 
requirements, despite that the security requirements are elicited by the same poll of 
stakeholders. For example, a smart application of public transport has different security 
requirements from the same stakeholders than a smart application of a city-wide weather 
monitor service. 
Enabling the security analysis of such large-scale and dynamic systems, such as smart cities 
is a significant research challenge. Traditional security requirements engineering and network 
security use a static approach. In a static approach, the majority of security mechanisms are 
deployed around the external facing nodes of a network. It follows the phrase “We want our 
network to be like a M&M, with a hard crunchy outside and a soft chewy center”. Static security 
is becoming less appealing in the modern computing paradigm, where network boundaries are 
becoming more and more blurred. In a world where more and more devices and services are 
becoming interconnected, the sophistication and complexity of attacks are increasing. In order 
to secure an IoT system, we require mechanisms and tools that can interact with their 
environment to alter their security according to the facing threats. 
1.1 Contributions 
This paper aims to address is how to perform a security analysis in a smart city public transport 
application using the Apparatus Framework. Specifically, we extend our previous work [4–6] in 
the Apparatus Framework by refining the following components of the Framework: 
1. A conceptual model for expressing an IoT system during the design phase. Design phase 
models are used to identify high-level security components such as security policies and 
stakeholders’ requirements. 
2. A conceptual model for expressing an IoT system during the implementation phase. To 
identify and propose low-level security components such as security mechanisms and system 
vulnerabilities. 
3. A step-by-step approach to navigate between the design and implementation phase models. 
4. A class-based notation of the modeling language of the Framework. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the related work in the fields of IoT 
modeling and IoT security modeling. Section 3 presents the proposed metamodels for IoT 
systems and transformation rules. Section 4 describes a security analysis of a smart public 
transport application using the proposed metamodels. Section 5 concludes this paper and 
discusses limitations and future extensions of the present work. 
2 Related Work 
The literature has provided us with a number of works that visualize and model specific aspects 
of IoT systems. Many of those works focus on modeling the sensor aspect of IoT while other 
works focus on modeling the services provided by an IoT system. 
In their work about Service-Oriented Middleware for the IoT [7, 8], the authors propose an 
ontology for IoT. Their ontology models three aspects of the real world present in the IoT. The 
first aspect is the Thing described in a Device Ontology. The second aspect consists of concepts 
and functionality of “things”, modeled in a Domain Ontology as mathematical formulas, and third 
is an approximation aspect that describes models to be used to approximate unavailable services 
and estimate missing information. This work does not take into account the security issues that 
can be faced in an IoT system and does not provide a way to model the social components of IoT 
systems. 
 OntoSensor [9] constructs an ontology-based descriptive specification model for sensors by 
excerpting parts of SensorML [10] descriptions and extending the IEEE Suggested Upper Merged 
Ontology (SUMO). Another ontology that models network sensors is SenaaS [11]. The approach 
of SenaaS is sensor-as-a-service by realizing the eventdriven service-oriented architecture (SOA) 
in IoT domain. A similar approach is used by De et al. [12] in their work about service modeling 
of IoT. Their model captures the components of the IoT domain and provides a formal 
representation of the interactions. Their work is based on SENSEI [13]. SENSEI was aimed at 
realizing ambient intelligence in future networks and service environments by developing a 
framework of universal service interfaces for wireless sensor and actuator networks (WSANs). 
The core modeling concept considered in SENSEI is the “resource”, with all sensors, actuators, 
and processors being modeled as resources. All those works have in common the modeling of 
IoT sensors, IoT services or both. The social aspects of such networks are not taken into account 
and as such the ontologies do not provide a way to model users and people. Another concept 
missing is the security aspect of those networks. 
An ontology for a security-enabled Internet of Things with a focus on the interoperability was 
proposed by Alam et al. [14]. They propose a functional architecture of the IoT framework that 
incorporates secure access provision. Their work aims to address how different security 
attributes and constraints lying in different administrative domains will work together to secure 
an integrated operation. Their paper highlights an important security issue faced by IoT systems: 
how the same system is affected by different administrative domains. 
Ikram et al. [15] express IoT systems using a chemical computing approach. They argue that 
the complexity of IoT can be modeled in a similar manner to chemical computing models. Their 
model can express social components using the User Plane. Laghari et at. [16] use the Cognitive 
Agent-based Computing (CABC) framework to model a Complex communication network. They 
can model social constructs with the use of Agent. Both works do not model the security of an 
IoT system. 
The works described were not developed for security analysis or modeling social interactions 
in IoT systems. Instead, they focused on modeling specific aspects of IoT. While focus only on 
specific domains can offer valuable insights, it is not helpful when performing security analysis 
on large-scale systems that are composed of different domains. For such environments require 
a holistic approach to security analysis. Environments such as smart cities, which have a 
multitude of applications, devices, and stakeholders. They represent systems with a large attack 
surface and as well as complex interconnected relationships. The Apparatus Framework aims to 
provide a holistic approach to facilitate modeling and security analysis in IoT systems. This is 
done by providing a language with constructs to express the sociotechnical components of a 
system, in addition to processes for identifying threats and vulnerabilities of such systems. 
3 Modeling language of Apparatus 
The modeling language is used to create IoT systems models for security analysis. The modeling 
language is composed of metamodels that define concepts to express IoT systems in different 
layers. An IoT system is essentially a network of various devices and for that reason, the initial 
core concepts of the conceptual model are the device and the network connection [4]. Using the 
information provided by the architecture of an IoT system along with the requirements of the 
system’s stakeholders, security requirements can be elicited. However, security analysis in the 
architectural level offers both advantages and limitations. The architecture of a system offers 
valuable information for security analysis, such as the supported protocols of network 
connections between nodes or the flow of data inside a network. On the other hand, certain 
aspects of a system are not expressed, such as user interaction or authentication mechanisms. 
Limitations of a hardware architectural approach can be mitigated by introducing non-hardware 
 architectural concepts along with hardware architectural components. The conceptual model of 
Apparatus is modular. The concepts of the modeling language are grouped into different 
modules based on their thematic context, to allow a security engineer to only use the modules 
that are needed. Since IoT has computer networking components, concepts from computer 
networks such as network connections and network domains as well as concepts from generic 
modeling languages such as actor, are incorporated in Apparatus. The security requirements 
concepts that are used are modeled after the Secure Tropos security requirements method [17]. 
Secure Tropos was chosen because it is an established requirements engineering method whose 
security concepts align with other requirements methods such as work by Haley [18]. It enables 
security engineers familiar with those methods to quickly get acquainted with Apparatus security 
concepts. 
We define a security requirement as a “a restriction related to security issues, such as 
privacy, integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of a multiagent 
system under development by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with 
some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives”, an 
approach used by Secure Tropos concept of security constraint [19]. A similar definition of 
security requirements is given by Haley [18]. He defines them as “constraints on the system’s 
functional requirements, rather than being themselves functional requirements”. 
The modeling language is composed of two metamodels. The first metamodel provides 
concepts and constraints to model an IoT system during the design phase. The second 
metamodel provides concepts and constraints to model IoT systems during the implementation 
phase. The distinction is made due to the different requirements and different information 
engineers have about a system during each phase. During the design phase, an engineer models 
the idea of the system without being restricted by the hardware or software specifications. For 
example during the design phase, an engineer may require a system component that will 
function as an Intrusion Detection (IDS) system. The engineer may not know at the design time 
whether the IDS will be a hardware device or a software application. During the implementation 
phase whether the IDS will be a hardware device or a software application is necessary since it 
affects both the topology of the network and its security requirements. During the 
implementation phase engineers have more information about the IoT system, such as versions 
of software applications, operating network ports, user profiles and external facing nodes. 
Information about the system’s architecture can be included in the modeling instances of the IoT 
system to produce more accurate results. 
Each phase offers different types of security analysis. During the design phase, an engineer 
can model the threats and the vulnerabilities of the system. Design phase security analysis 
cannot be used to express specific vulnerabilities of the system or security mechanisms that aim 
to mitigate them. Both the vulnerability and the security mechanism are concepts of an 
implemented system since they represent specific weaknesses or improvements on the 
hardware or software components of a system. 
3.1 Design Phase Metamodel 
The design phase metamodel provides a set of rules that design phase IoT models must adhere 
to. The metamodel is defined via a UML class diagram. Each UML class defines a concept that 
either describes an component of the system or behavior that impacts that system. Concepts 
are composed by a set of attributes that capture specific information of the model. Each concept, 
unless otherwise noted has the property description which describes the component of the IoT 
system. The design phase metamodel is shown in Fig. 1 and has the following concepts: 
 3.1.1 Network module 
1. Device: initially named IoT node in [4]. It is an object of the physical world (physical thing) or 
an object of the virtual world (virtualized thing). It is used to represent either physical 
components, such as hardware-based actuators and mobiles phones or virtualized 
components, such as cloud-based devices of an IoT system [1]. 
2. Application: is part of the information world (information thing). An Application represents a 
software component that is running on a Device. 
3. Micronet: is an environment that a security engineer can configure in terms of their security. 
A Micronet is a managed environment that constitutes a collection of Devices and 
Applications enable an IoT system to perform a function. Examples of Micronets are a smart 
home, an agricultural network of sensors or a company’s internal network. The boundaries 
of the Micronet are defined during the model creation by the engineer. For example, one 
Micronet can include only the devices that are part of a specific network domain, while 
another can include all the devices that are in the same room. The same device can belong 
to both Micronets and each Micronet can impose different security controls on the devices. 
The property of the Micronet is: 
(a) purpose: describes the goal or the function of the Micronet. 
4. Net: represents environments that their security configuration is not known and their 
behavior cannot be configured by the security engineer. While Nets may not be malicious, 
they represent a level of danger to an IoT system that must taken into account during the 
model development. Similarly to the Micronet, the boundaries of a Net are defined by the 
engineer. Examples of the Net are external networks to the IoT system that a security 
engineer either has little or no knowledge of, such as a third party cloud infrastructure or 
hostile deployment environments. It is possible, that the same device can be part of Net and 
a Micronet. For example, an IoT system has a server that hosts a set of virtual machines to its 
users. While the engineer can configure the server, the usage of the virtualized assets of the 
servers are configured by the users. Malicious user can try to exploit the virtualized assets in 
order to compromise the server. As a result, the virtualized assets compose a Net. 
5. Information: is represents either hard data, such as authentication logs and temperature 
data, or soft data, such as access credentials and user passwords. 
3.1.2 Social module 
1. Actor: is used to represent people or groups of people that interact with an IoT system [19]. 
An Actor can be a stakeholder of the system. An Actor may never be malicious. The concept 
of Actor can be used to represent groups of people with different privileges, such as root 
users or the administrative personnel of a University. The property of the Actor is the 
following: 
(a) intent: describes what the Actor wants to achieve or gain by interacting with the IoT 
system. 
3.1.3 Security module 
1. Asset: any actor, device, application or information of the system that either (1) is considered 
valuable by the stakeholders and needs to be protected; (2) a malicious actor wants; or (3) 
acts as a stepping stone to further attacks. While assets that are valuable by the stakeholders 
can be elicited requirements phases, assets that malicious actor wants or can be used for 
further attacks are not always apparent [20]. Examples of assets are the access credentials 
 known by an actor, sensitive information stored in a database or a sensor that has read/write 
privileges to a server. 
2. Threat: a function that can be used maliciously or a system that has the means to exploit a 
vulnerability of a legitimate system. A threat can only target an asset of the IoT system. The 
property of the threat is: 
(a) threatType: represents the classification of the threat according to the STRIDE acronym 
[21]. 
3. Constraint: is “a restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity, and 
availability, which can influence the analysis and design of a system under development by 
restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of 
the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives” [19]. The constraint has the 
following property: 
(a) propertyType: the classification of the constraint according to the extended CIA triad [22]. 
3.2 Implementation Phase Metamodel 
The implementation phase metamodel [4] refines the design phase with additional concepts and 
attributes. The added concepts and attributes represent information that is not known in the 
design phase and is beneficial for security analysis. A security engineer has more detailed 
knowledge of an IoT system and better understanding of its security requirements. For example, 
in the implementation phase, the security engineer knows the type of network protocols that 
will be used by the system. Moreover, the software versions of the devices that provide services 
to the system are known. That additional information can be used to elicit security issues that 
were not apparent in the design phase. We can leverage implementation specific knowledge to 
either automate or semiautomate certain types of security analysis. For example, the process of 
vulnerability identification requires hardware and software information. For the majority of the 
cases, 
 
 Fig. 1 Design phase metamodel 
vulnerability identification of a system requires penetration testing. Security engineers will 
gather information of a system through various means and then use that information to identify 
the system’s vulnerabilities. By incorporating that information into a model, we can perform the 
process of vulnerability identification without affecting the actual IoT system. An added benefit 
is that engineers are able to experiment with various models that represent different system 
configurations to evaluate their attack surface. The proposed metamodel is shown in Fig. 2: 
The refined concepts of the implementation phase are the: (1) Device; (2) Application; (3) 
Micronet and (4) Information. The added concepts are: (1) Vulnerability and (2) Mechanism. 
The modules of the implementation phase metamodel along with their concepts are the 
following: 
3.2.1 Network Module 
1. Device: implementation phase concept, refines the design phase Device concept with 
additional attributes. The added properties of the Device are: 
(a) layer: the conceptual layer of the IoT architecture to which the Device belongs. 
Apparatus uses a three-layer architecture that consists of the Application Layer, 
Network Layer and the Perception Layer [23,24]. Other works identify other 
architectures that provide more levels of abstraction. For example, a Service Oriented 
Architecture based approach identifies five layers, application, service composition, 
service management, object abstraction, objects [25]. Another approach by Lu, identifies 
other layers, that are application, middleware, coordination, backbone network, existed 
alone network, access layer, edge technology [26]. The proposed architectures for IoT 
have yet to fuse into a single reference model [27], for that reason we chose the three-
layer approach. It provides the necessary properties for reasoning about security while 
allowing to be extended if more levels of abstraction are introduced into the final 
reference model of IoT. The layers of IoT architecture should not be confused with the 
OSI model [28] since the two models try to conceptualize different constructs and 
concepts. The value of the layer attribute can be (1) application, (20 gateway or (3) 
perception; 
(b) type: is used to define the kind of the Device. Examples of a Device type are a sensor, a 
mobile phone or a server; 
(c) service: is the type of role or operation that the Device performs for the system. This 
value may include network services such as ssh, ftp, data processing filtering and relaying 
of data; 
(d) input: what is required in order for the node to perform its role or operation. It takes an 
enumerated value as an input that is dataEnvironmental, dataDigital, command, action, 
notification, trigger; 
(e) output: is the result of the Device operation or role. It may take the same values as the 
input property; 
(f) update: how the software on the Device is being updated. The updates can be automatic, 
require a specific action or false. 
2. Network Connection: the type of network communication protocol used between the 
Devices. The properties of the network connection are: 
(a) description: the type of connection, it can either be wireless, signifying a connection 
using a wireless protocol or cable, signifying a connection using a wired medium. It takes 
an enumerated value as an input; 
 (b) listOfProtocols: is a list of the supported network protocols by the network connection. 
It takes an array of string values as an input, each value in the array represents a 
supported network protocol. 
3. Application: implementation phase concept refines the design phase concept of Application 
with additional attributes. The properties of the Application are: 
(a) version: the software’s version type number. For example, if the Application represents 
the iOS operating system, the version would be the iOS release version, such as v10.2.3. 
(b) update: how the Application is being updated. The updates can be automatic, require a 
specific action or false. 
4. Micronet: implementation phase concept refines the design phase concept with an additional 
attribute. The property of the Micronet is: 
(a) state: the nature of a Micronet in terms of its Device network connectivity gateway layer. 
The state can either be dynamic, meaning that the Devices in the network change 
network domains during their usage or static meaning that the Devices in the system do 
not change network domains. Examples of dynamic IoT systems are networks of 
vehicular fleets, drones, and other mobile devices since devices in such networks move 
distances geographically. Examples of static IoT are smart homes and industrial IoT 
systems since devices in such systems are stationary during their lifecycle. 
5. Information: implementation phase concept that extends the design phase concept of 
Information with an added attribute. The additional attribute of Information is: 
(a) location: corresponds to the geographical location of the information stored in the 
device. It can be used to represent if information (data) is physically stored inside a 
network or are hosted by a third-party service. Moreover different regions have different 
laws regarding digital information that ultimately affect the overall security of a system 
and the proposed constraints of the system. 
3.2.2 Security Module 
1. Vulnerability: a software, hardware or usage policy weakness that can be exploited by an 
adversary toward compromising a system. Hardware and Software Vulnerabilities can be 
identified using techniques such as penetration testing. Hardware and software 
vulnerabilities can be identified from public access vulnerability databases such as CVE 1 and 
NVD 2. Such databases store vulnerabilities using unique IDs. Vulnerabilities IDs are used by 
security engineers to exchange information about security incidents. 
2. Mechanism: a Mechanism when implemented protects against one or more Vulnerabilities. 
If the Vulnerability is publicly identified and stored in a vulnerability database, a security 
engineer can use the proposed security mechanisms in order to mitigate it. A Mechanism 
could be applied dynamically when a certain event is detected by the system or they can be 
a constant process. For example, during the event of DoS attack, a system may enlist 
additional resources to spread the impact of the attack. Once the attack is mitigated, the 
system will release the additional resources reduce its operational costs. The property of 
Mechanism is: 
(a) trigger: is used to describe the behavior or event that will cause the application of the 
Mechanism. For example, a trigger could be a constant, meaning that the mechanism is 
continuously active, or it could be a detection of an attack. 
                                                                    
1 https://cve.mitre.org/cve/ 
2 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search 
  
Fig. 2 Implementation phase metamodel 
Identical constructs, such as fields of sensors, users with the same privileges or software 
applications that have the same configuration, can be modeled either as a single node or 
individual nodes. That choice is given to the security engineer that develops the model. An 
engineer may choose to include all nodes in a model to better assess the attack of the system. 
To analyze a large system, an engineer can tackle the complexity by using specialized software 
tools. ASTo has a number of functions that facilitate the analysis of large systems by applying a 
class-based notation system. 
3.3 Notation in the Apparatus 
Models of the Apparatus Framework are represented in the form of graphs. Concepts are 
represented as graph nodes and the relationships between the nodes are represented as graph 
edges. Contrary to other modeling languages that use shapes or colors to distinguish concepts 
in a static manner [19,29,30], the Apparatus Framework uses classes. 
The reasoning behind the class-based approach is the decoupling of the visual representation 
from its underlying meaning. Visual representation of Apparatus models can differ, based on the 
engineers’ preferences and requirements. For example, an engineer may want to use a different 
shape and color for each concept in a model, while another may believe that the additional 
visualizations make the model less readable. In Apparatus, visual representation corresponds to 
how we want models to look, while classes correspond to what we want to bring our attention 
on. Classes are used to add additional attributes, either visual or textual, on elements of the 
graph. Classes are applied dynamically on the graph, depending on the type of information needs 
to be displayed. For example, a security engineer wants to validate if all the threats in the model 
are mitigated. During the validation procedure, the engineer requires specific information of the 
model. The nodes and edges of interest are the concepts of Threat, Constraints and the 
relationship Mitigates. The rest of the elements of the graph are not relevant. To facilitate that 
type of analysis, we want to bring attention to the elements of interest and blur all other 
 elements. By adding different classes to the elements, we add visual and textual cues based on 
the analysis process the engineer is performing. 
Each class has a definition and a description. The definition dictates the information that we 
want to convey to an engineer at a specific time. The description represents the visual and textual 
attributes that are being added to the element. While the definition of the classes cannot be 
changed, the description can be modified. The description of classes refers to the front-end 
representation of the models and as a result, it can be interchangeable. For example, a set of 
class description can add visual components to nodes, such as colors or shapes, while another 
can add textual components such as labels. 
The Apparatus Framework does not impose a specific way of representing models in a visual 
manner. However, a default front-end representation of Apparatus models is used by ASTo along 
with a defined a set of class descriptions. The visualization of graphs ASTo uses a customizable 
color palette on the notation classes. Colors values are prefixed with asto. and the name of the 
color. The notation classes are presented in Tab. 1. 
An example of how classes are applied dynamically in ASTo, following the threat validation 
described above, as an algorithm is the following: 
1. The class fade is applied to all elements in the graph. 
2. The class attention is applied to all threat concepts. 
3. The class protection is applied to all constraint concepts. 
4. The class normal is applied to all mitigate relationships. 
Table 1 Notation Classes of the Apparatus Framework 
 
normal the element has no special condition 
the element is colored as 
asto.text (light gray or black) 
fade the element has reduced focus 
the element is colored as a 
normal element with 
reduced opacity to 25% 
first-selection 
the element is the first selection of the 
engineer 
the element is colored as 
asto.blue 
second-selection 
the element is the second selection of 
the engineer 
the element is colored as 
asto.orange 
attention 
the element has security 
implications and requires the 
attention of the engineer 
the element is colored as 
asto.orange 
protection 
the element is improving the security 
posture of the system 
the element is colored as 
asto.cyan 
 
By using that algorithm we focus the attention of the engineer on the elements of the model 
that are important during the threat validation process. 
3.4 Transition rules between the different engineering phases 
During the security analysis workflow, a security engineer may have to create models of the same 
system in both the design phase and the implementation phase. This may be done during the 
   
 normal development process of a system, from its design to implementation. In such a case an 
engineer will be able to use an existing design phase model it to transition to the implementation 
phase. In that way, engineers can reuse existing models to reduce the development process. 
While the normal engineering workflow would progress from the design to the 
implementation phase, certain use cases would require for an engineer to transition from the 
implementation phase to the design phase. An example of such a use case is the development 
of a redevelopment of an existing IoT system. Redevelopment of a system is more easily made 
in the design phase, where an engineer can abstract its components. But if there is an existing 
implementation phase model, the process of transitioning to the design phase may not be 
considered cost-effective. In the Apparatus Framework an engineer can model the existing IoT 
system as an implementation phase model. Then the implementation to design transition rules 
can be applied to generate a design phase of the system. 
To facilitate the transition process between the two engineering phases, we define a 
structured approach that can be used to transition between a design phase model and an 
implementation phase model and vice versa. 
3.4.1 Design to Implementation phase transition rules 
To transition a model from the design to the implementation phase we perform the following 
procedure: 
1. Micronet concepts gain the state attribute. 
2. Device concepts gain the layer, type, service, input, output, update attributes. 
3. Design concept Devices that have the connect relationship with other Devices, replace that 
connection with the concept of Network Connection. 
4. Application concepts gain the version, update attributes. 
5. Information concepts gain the location attribute. 
6. All other concepts remain the same. 
3.4.2 Implementation to Design transition rules 
To transition between an implementation phase model to a design phase model, we perform the 
procedure stated above in reverse: 
1. Remove the attributes the attributes from the concepts that have been outlined during the 
steps above. 
2. Remove the concepts of Mechanism. 
3. Remove the concepts of Vulnerability. 
Both procedures have been implemented in ASTo, where an engineer can perform them in 
an automated manner. 
4 Illustrative example of security analysis using the Apparatus Framework 
To illustrate how the proposed framework can be used we will perform a concise security analysis 
on a smart city IoT application. We will model a subset of a smart public transport system. The 
system in the example does not represent a real-life smart public transport system. It is designed 
to showcase the certain features of the Apparatus 
Framework with the minimum numbers of components in order to provide a precise and clear 
application. 
 During the example, we will begin our security analysis from the design phase. The city 
already has a certain infrastructure for public transport in place. Those components will act as 
the initial components of the system. The hardware and software components of the system are: 
1. A central processing unit that will act as the focal point of processing for the entire smart 
public system. 
2. A microcomputer, such as a raspberry pi, on board the bus. The microcomputer acts as a 
processing unit for the bus’s internal operations. 
3. A router on board the bust. The router will provide a Wi-Fi network to the bus’s passengers 
and other network connectivity to the bus’s system through an LTE connection. 
4. Smart sensors on bus stops. They will exchange traffic and route information between the 
buses and the central processing unit. 
5. The smartphones of passengers that will use the dedicated mobile application of the smart 
public transport system. 
Based on the components of the system, we can create the design phase model using the 
network and social modules of the Apparatus Framework, as shown in Fig. 3. 
The stakeholders of the system, in this case, the users of the transportation system. The 
smart public transport will have the following security requirements that are elicited from the 
stakeholders: 
 
Fig. 3 Design phase network and social system model 
1. SR1: passengers should not be able to tamper with bus’s hardware systems. 
2. SR2: passengers personal data should not be able to be exposed without authorization 
through the bus’s resources. 
The requirements stated above will form the core of our security analysis. We will use them 
to identify threats, constraints and the assets of the system. While in Fig. 3 we modeled to the 
 whole system, in the interest of space, we are going to limit our security analysis only on the 
domain of the bus. 
The security analysis in Apparatus is asset-centric. The initial step is to identify the assets of 
the system. Based on SR1 and S2 we identify the following Assets in the system. 
1. A1: the physical aspect of the bus’s microcomputer. 
2. A2: the personal information of the passengers. 
The second step in the security analysis is to model the threats of the system, based on the 
identified asset. A threat (T1) that impacts the A1 is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack that 
originates from a passenger with malicious intent. The attacker physically damages the device, 
thus making its resources unavailable to legitimate users. A threat (T2) that impacts the A2 is 
social engineering attack aiming to obtain a passenger’s personal data. That attack is originating 
from external connections. In this case, the Internet. To summarize, the threats on the systems 
are: 
1. T1: physically attack the microcomputer to perform a DoS attack. 
2. T2: exploit the smart transport application to obtain passengers’ personal data through social 
engineering. 
Once threats have been modeled, the next step of the security analysis is to proposes system 
Constraints. We propose the following Constraints to mitigate the identified threats T1 and T2. 
1. C1: physically protect the microcomputer to mitigate T1. 
2. C2: smart transport application must notify the user every time request for his personal 
information is made from an untrusted source, to mitigate T2. 
The Fig. 4 presents the Micronet system model of the bus, including the security 
components. 
 
Fig. 4 Design phase bus Micronet system model 
When the design phase security analysis is completed, the next step is to perform a security 
analysis during the implementation phase. We will apply the Design to Implementation rules of 
 the Apparatus framework. In this particular example, the transformation process is automated 
using the ASTo software application. 
In the implementation phase a number of components, such as the Device, Application, and 
Micronet obtain additional attributes, to better represent the more detailed information we 
have. We can determine those attributes using information provided by the stakeholders of the 
system. Alternatively, we can apply information gathering techniques common in information 
security in the existing implementation of the system. Such techniques include scanning the 
existing network range for active devices, active ports, and known services. 
After the transformation rules are applied and the stakeholders provide us with the 
necessary information we create an implementation phase system model as shown in Fig. 5. 
The implementation has two additional components that better illustrate the security 
posture of a system. Those are the Mechanism and the Vulnerability. T1 is the threat of physically 
attacking a device. In the case of the smart public transportation, the Vulnerability (V1) is that 
the device (microcomputer) is physically accessible to 
 
Fig. 5 Implementation phase transformed bus Micronet system model 
actors and malicious actors alike. To protect the system from V1, we propose that the 
microcomputer should be located in a secure location. The T2 is the threat of a malicious attacker 
exploiting the smart transport application to obtain the personal information of the passengers. 
The application’s version is 1.0.0. The stakeholders inform us that the application does not 
sanitize requests based on their origin. Meaning that requests are treated the same whether 
they originated from trusted or untrusted sources. To protect the system, we propose that 
passengers should be notified and manually accept requests originating from untrusted sources, 
as a Mechanism (M2). 
The implementation system model that includes the final version of the security analysis is 
shown in Fig. 6. 
The example is not an extensive security analysis of the proposed system. It was designed to 
demonstrate certain aspects of the Framework. Even a small system, such as the one presented, 
can generate a graph with hundreds of nodes and complex relationships. 
A complete security example is out of the scope of this journal, but we will provide some 
additional examples of security analysis that can be performed based on the existing information 
encoded in the system models. The software and hardware components of the system have the 
 attribute update with the value action. The action requires that an actor must manually perform 
the update on the device or application. That means that when a new exploit for the particular 
component is made discovered, the system is vulnerable until an actor performs the update. 
Depending on the severity of the exploit, the system could include mechanisms that treat the 
exploitable components as compromised Devices until they are updated. 
Other attributes of the modeling language are used to identify the security posture of the 
system. For example, the concept of Network connection attribute of Description portrays 
whether the connection uses a wireless or a wired medium. As a general rule, wireless 
connections are more susceptible to repudiation and information disclosure attacks, than wired 
connections. The connections medium will affect the mechanisms that a security engineer will 
propose. 
 
Fig. 6 Implementation phase security bus Micronet system model 
The Micronet of the bus in the example above has the value of the State attribute as dynamic. 
That means that the components of the Micronet are moving in physical space. To retain their 
connection to the rest, the components frequently change their gateway endpoints. In the 
instance of the Bus Micronet, the router of the bus provides Internet connectivity to the other 
components through LTE. The LTE infrastructure is not under the control domain of the security 
engineer. Dynamic systems require different mechanisms than a static system. In a static system, 
an engineer can deploy certain perimeter mechanisms such as a back-end firewall or Intrusion 
Detection system. On the other hand, the same mechanisms are less useful in a dynamic system. 
The layer attribute of the Device concept can be used to infer both the conceptual use of the 
Device and its inhered physical location. Devices that belong to the application layer are usually 
processing servers that either are located in the cloud or in physically secure location. Devices 
that belong to the perception layer are usually located in close proximity to actors. They 
represent sensors and end-point devices. A Constraint that can be proposed in a Micronet, is 
that all Devices of the system that have the layer: perception, should be physically protected. 
Since Devices belonging to the perception layer of IoT offer physical access to both actors and 
malicious actors. They are vulnerable to threats that require physical access. 
5 Conclusion 
 This paper starts by illustrating the importance of proposing a novel modeling approach to 
facilitate security analysis and reasoning in IoT systems on smart city applications. Given the 
dynamic nature of IoT systems and their vast applications, it is expected that their security 
specifications will need to mitigate their vast attack surface. To enable the security analysis of 
such systems, we presented a number of components of the Apparatus Framework. The 
components where a set of modular metamodels to express IoT systems along with security and 
social constructs. The first metamodel is used to express an IoT system during the design phase, 
while the second metamodel is used to express an IoT during the implementation phase. To 
facilitate analysis during the two engineering phases, we proposed transformation rules that can 
be applied to convert model between them. 
To illustrate the use of the proposed modeling approach we performed a smallscale security 
analysis on a smart city application. The smart city application consisted of a smart public 
transport system that contained different hardware and software components along with 
different stakeholders. 
The security analysis and visualization of the system were performed using a software 
application named ASTo that facilitates the security analysis of IoT systems. ASTo is developed 
to support the Apparatus Framework. 
IoT system modeling has certain challenges. Once such challenge is scalability of models that 
are expected to be composed of thousands of nodes. The concepts of Micronet and Net were 
developed to reduce “noise” in visual models by grouping together and abstracting systems 
based on common goals and functionality. Instead of analyzing systems composed of thousands 
of identical nodes, security engineers can group such nodes into Mirconets and Net. When the 
security analysis of the individual nodes inside a Micronet or a Net ,needs to take place, an 
engineer can only view and analyze those nodes. 
A limitation of the current state of the Framework, is that it requires domain specific 
expertise from a variety of the stakeholders in order to create models. The creation of a model 
requires knowledge of the network architecture of a system, the perceived assets of the system 
as well as the user-system interaction. Future work aims to introduce a number of automated 
and semi-automated processes to creating models and deducing security issues. This approach 
will bring to the attention of a security engineer security issues based on the current topology of 
a model and best practices. The aim is to automate certain aspects of security analysis, such as 
vulnerability identification and model generation, by providing additional information to a 
security engineer. Model generation can be automated using network capture files or even 
textual descriptions of existing systems. Using that approach security engineers will be 
encouraged to experiment with different system configurations and their effects on the overall 
system’s security posture. A future publication aims to present our findings from a large-scale 
study, where security engineers, not associated with the development of the Framework, apply 
it to real-life IoT systems. 
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